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Abstract: The proposed traceback scheme does not take into account the trust of node which leads to the low 
effectiveness. A trust-aware probability marking (TAPM) traceback scheme is proposed to locate malicious source quickly. In TAPM 
scheme, the node is marked with difference marking probability according to its trust which is deduced by trust evaluation. The high 
marking probability for low trust node can locate malicious source quickly, and the low marking probability for high trust node can 
reduce the number of marking to improve the network lifetime, so the security and the network lifetime can be improved in TAPM 
scheme. 
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1 Introduction 
Our society, economy and critical infrastructures have largely depended on information and communications 
technologies (ICT) [1-6]. Cyber-attacks [2-6] are becoming more attractive and can lead to large-scale (or global) 
systemic failures, resulting in loss of human life and social unrest with our dependence on information technology 
increases. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs), as one of pivotal component of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) [7-8], 
plays an irreplaceable role in roads, railways, industrial oil pipeline, and a wide range of environmental monitoring 
[3, 4, 7-13]. 
Sensors are often highly cost-sensitive. They require smaller processors and memories which are resource-
constrained in energy due to the nature of small size [1, 7, 11-13]. They are often unattended and prone to different 
kinds of attacks because of their operating nature [9-12, 14]. For example, DDos attack, Ref. [15] proposed a scheme 
to resist this attack. In order to ensure data security, Ref. [16] present a new SCA-WSN scheme that not only achieves 
user anonymity but also works with the computation loads for sensors effectively. As one of cyber forensics 
technologies, traceback is a promising solution to counter the cyber-attacks by determining the probable source of 
malicious node. Packets marking approach is an effective traceback approach for malicious attack. In order to locate 
malicious source, the victims consult upstream nodes to reconstruct attack paths by broadcasting the information of 
the malicious packet(s) in the traceback request [10, 11, 12, 13].  
In Packets marking scheme [10, 12], each node adds its ID information to data packets in the routing process, 
the marking information will be longer with the routing of data packets, which can damage the network lifetime. To 
weaken the effect of Packets marking scheme on the network lifetime, probability marking scheme (PM) is proposed 
in Ref. [10]. Each passed packet are marked by the nodes with a certain probability, which can reduce the amount of 
mark information and improve the network lifetime. In traceback scheme, the key method is to marking generated 
data packets by suspicious nodes, thus it can provide many useful information for determining malicious source, and 
the packets generated by the "good" nodes are not marked in the network, which can’t damage the network lifetime. 
In previous schemes, the marking probability have nothing to do with the nodes’ credibly. Thus the performance for 
 
system is not good enough. 
Based on the above analysis, this paper proposes a new trust-aware probability marking (TAPM) traceback 
scheme. TAPM scheme's main contribution are as follows: 
(1) A trust-aware probability marking (TAPM) traceback scheme is proposed in this paper. In TAPM scheme, 
the marking probability for data packets are adjusted based on the trust of source node. Whereas the marking 
probability is high for low trust nodes, the malicious nodes can be located quickly. The marking information of most 
trustable nodes is low, so the amount of data transmitted to sink is less, the network lifetime can be improved. The 
less locate time for malicious nodes can ensure the network security.  
(2) This paper puts forward the active detection traceback scheme, which attempt to speed up locating malicious 
node. In previous schemes, the system can only get location information from the marking tuples which is generated 
by malicious nodes, so it is a passive defense approach. The time for locating malicious nodes is long and uncertain. 
The second innovation for TAPM scheme is active detection, nodes send lightweight detect packets to sink along 
malicious nodes, which greatly enhance the effectiveness of TAPM scheme. 
(3) TAPM scheme has good adaptability and extensibility. In previous schemes, the marking probability of the 
nodes are pre-determined, it can’t change when the network is attacked, so the system can spend more time and cost 
to determine the position of malicious nodes, and the efficiency for traceback is low. But in TAPM scheme, when a 
node is regarded as a suspect node by the system, the detection packets can be sent for obtaining more marking 
information of malicious nodes, and the marking probability of the node will be increased. So more marking 
information about malicious nodes can be obtained. Thus it has good efficiency and adaptability. 
(4) Through our extensive theoretical analysis and simulation study, it shows that: compare to the probability 
marking (PM) scheme with a probability of 0.8, TAPM scheme can reduce the total number of marking by 67.16% 
and improve network lifetime by 12.99%-36.61%.The traceback time is only 1/2-1/10 than that of PM scheme.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the related works are reviewed. The system model 
and problem statement are described in Section 3. In section 4, a novel TAPM scheme is presented. Security 
performance analysis is provided in section 5. Experimental result and comparison is conducted in section 6. We 
conclude in section 7. 
2 Related work 
Tracking technology (traceback technology) was first used in the IP network [17-19], the goal is to collect the 
routing information in the network, and then the system rebuild the network topology and locate the position of 
malicious nodes, so as to make the system remove malicious source to ensure network security [17-19]. 
But there are much difference between WSNs and cable IP network, some effective traceback schemes in IP 
network are not suitable for sensor network. Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) have emerged as a topical research 
area in recent years, propose a cross-domain Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) to scale across domains and deal with 
outbound requests using the reputation method [20, 21]. However, some modified traceback scheme can suitable for 
sensor network. There are mainly two schemes apply to the traceback in WSNs. One is packets marking [22], another 
is logging scheme [12]. Packets marking is an effective and popular traceback scheme in the wireless sensor network 
(WSN). In packets marking scheme, when sensor nodes forwarding packets, nodes add his ID and other information 
(i. e marking tuples) to packets. After Sink receives the data packets, Sink node reconstruct the path to the source 
nodes by reading marking tuples. If the source node is malicious node, the system will block or isolate the malicious 
node. The advantages of this scheme are: it is a simple protocol and almost no storage space requirement for nodes. 
The shortages are: the number of marking tuples will growth with the packets forwarding to Sink, but the data packets 
 
must to be divided into many pieces in order to send the data packets to Sink, which not only increase the conflict of 
routing, but also damage the network lifetime [9-11]. 
The probability marking (PM) scheme is proposed in Ref. [10], in PM scheme, nodes mark data packets with a 
certain probability. Obviously, in PM scheme, if the specified marking probability is 𝓅𝓅, the proportion between the 
amount of marking and the amount of reduced marking in PM scheme is (1 −𝓅𝓅). Thus, PM scheme can effectively 
improve the network lifetime. In order to further reduce the amount of marking information, the following researches 
put forward the scheme that each packet can be marked at most 𝑘𝑘 times [10]. In such scheme, every node marks 
packet with a certain probability. But after the data packet is marked k times, the following nodes are to replace the 
information that has been marked, which can ensure each packet can be marked at most 𝑘𝑘 times, this scheme is 
further reduce the amount of marking, so as to further improve the network lifetime. But the shortages of this scheme 
are: because each packet can be marked at most 𝑘𝑘 times, when the Sink collects the same data packets, the received 
marking information is far less than packets marking, so the Sink can rebuild one path to the source node when Sink 
receives more data packets, thus the traceback time is big. If every packet is limited to be marked 𝑘𝑘 times at most, 
nodes near to the Sink is to have higher probability to be marked. To overcome this deficiency, Ref. [10] presented 
a fair probability distribution mark scheme, which has a good effect. Ref. [23] proposed a hybrid method for tracking 
mobile objects with high accuracy and low computational cost.  
The scheme based on log (logging) is another kind of tracking technology for malicious nodes [1]. In this scheme, 
when the marking field in data packets is large, the marking information is stored in the nodes’ memory, then the 
nodes forwarding packets with unloading marking information to next node. In the process of traceback, Sink 
rebuilds a path from Sink to the source node through querying stored marking information in those nodes. In the 
traceback scheme based on logging, the proportion of mark information in packets is relatively low. Most of marking 
information is stored in sensor nodes. Once victims perceive the attack, or need a traceback, inquiry request is sent 
to required nodes. This information reserved in logging is sent to the Sink to reduce the amount of data received by 
the sink. So the advantage of this scheme is to have high network lifetime, Logging scheme has the shortage that 
node requires large storage capacity to store mark information, especially the area near to the Sink which has higher 
marking probability than the area far from the Sink, thus it requires large storage capacity.  
The CPMLT(combined packet marking and logging scheme for traceback, CPMLT) scheme has been proposed 
in Ref. [12], which combine marking and logging. In CPMLT scheme, a data packet can be marked at most 𝑘𝑘 times, 
each node marking data packets with a certain probability, nodes logging data packets after been marked 𝑘𝑘 times. 
It is a compromise in the node's storage capacity and the network life. 
A Logging joint Marking (LM) traceback scheme is proposed in Ref. [13]. Compare to the previous schemes, 
the most important improvement are: in the previous traceback schemes, the energy consumption and storage space 
of the area near to the Sink are seriously insufficient, much storage capacity and energy left in area far from Sink 
area. In LM scheme, packets are also marked at most 𝑘𝑘 times, each packet starts logging after been marked 𝑘𝑘 times. 
When the node’s storage space is not enough, data packets will be migrated to area far from the Sink, which can 
improve the network lifetime. So the scheme can make full use of the residual energy and storage space. 
3 The system model and Problem statement 
3.1 The System Model 
(1) We consider a WSN consisting of 𝑚𝑚 homogenous static sensor nodes 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖|𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1. .𝑚𝑚} and the sink node is 
 
𝑣𝑣0, ℳ ≜ {𝑣𝑣 = 𝑣𝑣0,𝑣𝑣1,𝑣𝑣2, … ,𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚} deployed over a 2-D round surveillance field, the network radius is 𝑅𝑅. Sink node 
𝑣𝑣0 is the center of the network. The communication radius of sensor nodes is 𝑟𝑟, the energy of Sink node is unlimited. 
Sensor nodes monitor their surroundings and once an event happened, nodes report to the Sink through multi-hop 
[24-26]. 
(2) The wireless sensor network is deployed in a hostile environment. We consider the following attack scenario. 
One compromised node is used to launch a false data injection attack to exhaust the network resources, designated 
as attack node or source node [11]. In case of an attack, the nodes marking passed packets with a certain 
probability 𝒫𝒫𝑖𝑖, the system can determine malicious source through those marking information which is similar to 
cyber forensics technologies. The malicious nodes are considered as a small proportion of the network [1, 10]. 
(3) The marking probability of the nodes are specified by the system (such as by Sink through the broadcast, or 
by controlling information). The nodes mark data packets with the specified marking probability. The nodes will 
expose themselves if they don’t mark data packets with the specified marking probability and the attack goal will 
not be achieved [27]. Therefore, the nodes are considered to abide by the given probability to marking packets. 
3.2 Energy consumption model 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝑙𝑙𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑2,       𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑑𝑑 < 𝑑𝑑0
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝑙𝑙𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑4,   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑑𝑑 > 𝑑𝑑0
   (1) 
   𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 = 𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒                                                               (2)     
The energy consumption model adopted in this paper is same as Ref. [7, 13], the energy consumption for 
transmission 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡  denote in Eq. (1), and energy consumption 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟 for receiving denote in Eq. (2). 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 represents 
transmitting circuit loss. Both the free space (𝑑𝑑2 power loss) and the multi-path fading (𝑑𝑑4 power loss) channel 
models are used in the model, depending on the distance between the transmitter and receiver. 𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 and 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎 are 
respectively the energy required by power amplification in the two models. l denotes the data bits. The above 
parameter settings can be seen in [7, 13]. The above parameter settings are given in Table 1, as adopted by Ref. [7, 
13] 
Table 1 network parameters 
Parameter  Value  
Threshold distance (d0) (m)  87  
Sensing range rs (m)  15  
Eelec (nJ/bit)  50  
efs (pJ/bit/m
2
)  10 
eamp (pJ/bit/m
4
)  0.0013  
Initial energy (J)  0.5  
3.3 Problem statement 
The main focus of this paper is to design a new effective TAPM scheme to traceback the DoS/DDoS attacks in 
WSNs. The goal of the TAPM scheme is to locate the malicious source as soon as possible at less cost, which can 
be categorized in following aspects:  
(1)Maximization of network lifetime. The basic goal of application requirement is to maximize network lifetime. 
The network lifetime can be defined as the time of the first node that dies [7, 13]. Since after the first node dies, it 
may affect the connectivity and coverage of the network severely leading the network cannot play a proper role. 
 
Hence, the definition of network lifetime in this paper is consistent with references [7, 13], which is defined as the 
time elapsed until the first sensor node in the network depletes its energy. We denote 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 as the energy consumption 
of node 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 in one round. 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the initial energy of node 𝒗𝒗𝒊𝒊. The formula of maximizing network lifetime can 
be expressed as follows: 
max(Γ) = max
𝑖𝑖∈{1..𝑚𝑚}
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖⁄ )                                             (3) 
(2) Scheme can locate attack source quickly when defending against attracts.  
The locate attack malicious source time 𝒯𝒯 is evaluated in terms of the number of marking information for the 
attack paths can be reconstructed. Obviously, in process of reconstructing the attack paths, if traceback scheme marks 
more data packets, then the system can collect much more marking information shortly and can locate malicious 
node quickly, , and then revoke compromised nodes in order to ensure the confidentiality of data traversing in the 
network [28, 29]. Therefore, min (𝒯𝒯) means to maximize marking information. 𝒷𝒷𝑖𝑖 denotes the number of marking 
information by node 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 in a unit time, and so  
min(𝒯𝒯) = max
𝑖𝑖∈{0..𝑚𝑚}
∑𝒷𝒷𝑖𝑖                                                       (4) 
Generally, compromising optimization exists in the performance indexes above. In summary, the optimization 








                                               (5)   
4 Trust-aware probability marking traceback scheme design  
4.1 Research motivation 
 In this paper, the motivation is based on the following two aspects: 









































x  (Trust)  
Fig. 1 probability density function of the nodes trust              Fig. 2 distribution function of the nodes trust 
(1) In previous probability marking (PM) schemes, every node 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 marks each passed packet with equal marking 
probability, the marking probability for data packet generated by malicious nodes is the same. Due to most nodes in 
the network are "good" nodes, it is important to decrease marking probability of packets which are generated by 
"good" nodes, and increase marking probability of packets which are generated by malicious nodes. So the network 
 
lifetime can be improved and the traceback ability for malicious nodes can be enhanced. 
The ratio of malicious nodes to all nodes in the network is relatively small, generally less than 10%. The 
probability density function of node trust can be described as logarithmic normal distribution [30], as can be seen in 
Fig. 1. Most nodes in the network are credible, so trust of most nodes are about 0.9. It can be seen form Fig. 2 that 
the proportion of node trust<0.3 is about 10%, which is in line with the actual situation that the proportion of 
malicious nodes in the network is small. For node trust distribution, it is described by the function of logarithmic 
normal distribution, but the other functions can also be used to describe the credibility distribution. As long as the 
function reflects that most nodes are "good" nodes in the network, it doesn’t influence the conclusions. 
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Fig. 3 marking probability according trust                          Fig. 4 The average marking probability   
 Based on marking scheme of TAPM scheme, a marking method with non-linear relationship between marking 
probability and nodes’ credibility is proposed, as can be seen in Fig. 3. In TAPM scheme, the marking probability 
rise sharply with the increase of node trust when node's credibility is low, the marking probability is low when the 
node’s credibility is high, which can meet the design goal for TAPM scheme. Fig. 4 shows the weighted average 
marking probability under different scheme. Though the marking probability for nodes with low credibility are more 
than 80% in TAPM scheme, the average marking information is only about 20% (see from Fig. 4). Even the marking 
probability is more than 40% in PM scheme, the effect is not as good as TAPM scheme, which shows that the 
traceback ability for malicious nodes in TAPM scheme is better than that of other schemes. On the other hand, due 
to decreasing marking probability of "good" nodes in the network, the number of transmission information is 
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Fig. 5 The lifetime                                      Fig. 6 The number of marking tag fluctuate based on time 
 
(2) To the best of our knowledge, the previous schemes use passive marking strategy, namely, data packets only 
can be marked when data packets are sent to the Sink. Therefore, this paper propose a kind of active marking 
probability scheme. In this scheme, for the suspicious nodes, nodes in the upstream of the routing generate probe 
packets. The difference between probe packet and data packet is that the length of data field is 0. Probe packets can 
route to the Sink bypass malicious nodes, so that they can increase the marking probability for specific suspicious 
nodes to locate malicious nodes quickly. Such as in Fig. 6, for suspicious nodes, if the system doesn’t adopt active 
detect strategy, the received marking packets are essentially unchanged per unit time in PM scheme (see from Fig. 
6). And if the system doesn’t adopt active detect mechanism in TAPM scheme, although the received marking packets 
per unit time is higher than that of PM scheme, it still can't meet the requirement of application (see from Fig. 6). If 
TAPM scheme adopts active detect scheme, the received marking packets can increase with the need of traceback, 
so as to completely get rid of the limitations of the original passive scheme, which make higher performance and 
more extensive applicability for TAPM scheme.  
4.2 The overview of TAPM scheme 
The structure of packets in TAPM scheme is illustrated in Fig. 7 which is similar Ref. [13]. Each packet is mainly 
composed of the following field: (1) Data field, represent the comment of data packets; (2) Source ID, denote the 
source node ID of packet; (3) Destination ID, denote the destination node ID of packet; (4) Marking field, represent 
the marking information which is composed of multiple marking tuple. However, each marking tuple includes 
multiple fields, such as in Fig. 7(b). It mainly includes: ① N-ID, denote the node ID of node which create marking 
tuple; ②f-log, the marking for logging, it is used in traceback scheme with marking and logging method. If f-log=1, 
it denotes marking information of data packets are stored in this node, or f-log=0; ③ f-mig, denote whether marking 
information are migrated to other nodes which is adopted in Ref. [13]; ④ Hkey (P.data), denote the value of data 
after hash data in data packets, it is used to test the consistency of data packets. 
... markυ1mark 2mark data
(a)  The structure of packets
Hkey (P.data)N_IDf_migf_log






Fig. 7 The structure of packets 
The overview of trust-aware probability marking (TAPM) traceback scheme can be illustrated in Fig. 8. In TAPM 
scheme, sensor nodes mark each data packets with a certain probability based on source nodes’ trust. If one node 
marks data packets, it can form marking tuple in Fig. 7(b), then add this marking information to marking field and 
forward to next node (or Sink). In case of an attack, the system can reconstruct attack path by those marking 
information to locate malicious source. 
The difference between TAPM scheme and previous schemes are: 
(1) Determine marking probability. When a data packet arrives to a node, firstly, the node reads source ID field 
of the data packet to determine the source node ID of the packet. Secondly, according to the credibility of source 
node, impose high marking probability of the packets which generated by suspicious nodes, and low marking 
probability of the packets which generated by trusted nodes according to node trust in section 4.4. 
(2) Generate and marking of detect packets. The second difference between TAPM scheme and previous schemes 
is: TAPM scheme actively generates probe packets with some marking information to collect enough marking 
information for locate malicious nodes quickly. It is shown in Fig. 8. Considering that node 𝑣𝑣5 , 𝑣𝑣11 , 𝑣𝑣13 are 
suspicious malicious nodes according to the received marking information, in order to improving the marking 
probability of the generated packets by suspicious malicious nodes, some nodes are selected in the routing upstream 
area of suspicious malicious nodes to send probe packets to Sink to locate malicious nodes quickly. In Fig. 8, the 
system chose three area I, II, III to send probe packets, the nodes send a certain number of probe packets to the Sink 
 
in these areas, the nodes which the probe packets passed by mark the probe packets with marking probability 1, 






























Fig. 8 Illustrate of trust-aware probability marking (TAPM) scheme   
The overview for TAPM scheme is discussed in this section. The two key issues for TAPM scheme are: (1) how 
to determine its marking probability based on nodes’ credibility. (2) How to choose nodes to send probe packets, 
how many probe packets should be sent? 
4.3 Computing of trust and marking probability 
   The Sink collects marking information from sensor nodes, then evaluate the trust of sensor nodes. This paper 
assumes that the network have the same data detection in intrusion detection system [1], which can detect each packet, 
then obtain each node’s credibility. Because this paper focuses on how to construct an effective method for obtaining 
the marking information of sensor nodes to locate malicious nodes, the method of trust evaluation for nodes is same 
as Ref. [31] which is used in the application layer to evaluate and manage trust. So we assume that the trust of sensor 
nodes can be get. More details can be found in [1, 31]. Considering the credibility for node 𝑗𝑗  in time t𝑖𝑖 
is 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖| 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≤ 1 when adopt trust evaluation method of Ref. [31]. The value of credibility  𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is closer to 
zero, the lower its credibility is, and the bigger the probability of malicious nodes is. On the other hand, the value of 
 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is closer to 1, which show that nodes are trusted. The system can form multiple evaluation results if the system 
receives data packets with a marker of node 𝑗𝑗 many times in a period of time. The evaluation result in the 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡ℎ time 
for node 𝑗𝑗 is: 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
(𝑘𝑘). The series of evaluation results can be expressed as:  𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗=�𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡1
(1) , 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡2
(2), … 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
(𝑤𝑤)�, where 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
(𝑘𝑘) ≤
1,𝑘𝑘 ∈ [1. .𝑤𝑤], 𝑤𝑤 is the biggest number of effective trust evaluation. The elements in �𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡1
(1), 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡2
(2), … 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
(𝑤𝑤)� are in 
interaction time order. 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡1
(1)
 is the longest evaluation result from now and 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤
(𝑤𝑤)
 is the last evaluation result. The total 
trust evaluation results of node 𝑗𝑗 are as follows: 
 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 = �
∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
(𝑘𝑘).𝒽𝒽(𝑘𝑘)𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘=1 𝑤𝑤,   𝑤𝑤 ≠ 0�
1,                                  𝑤𝑤 = 0
                                          
(6) 
𝒽𝒽(𝑘𝑘) ∈ [0,1] is attenuation function, it is used to make reasonable weighting of the trust evaluation at different 
times. The result of trust evaluation in the time closer to the current time have more conducive to judge the credibility 
of nodes. More weight should be given to new result for trust evaluation, thus the attenuation function is defined as: 
 
𝒽𝒽(𝑘𝑘) = � 1,   𝑘𝑘 = 𝑤𝑤𝒽𝒽(𝑘𝑘 − 1) = 𝒽𝒽(𝑘𝑘)− 1/𝑤𝑤,    1 ≤ 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑤𝑤                               (7) 
The value 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 of trust evaluation for any node 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 can be obtained by the system. After the system obtains the 
trust of each node, it can determine the marking probability function according the results. The marking probability 
function should have the following property. 
Character 1: The higher nodes’ credibility is, the lower the marking probability is. The marking probability 
should be increase with the decrease of nodes’ credibility. However, the increase ratio of marking probability function 
should be bigger than the decline rate of its trust. 
The marking probability function with those characteristics can ensure that the marking probability is high when 
node trust is low which is beneficial to locate malicious nodes quickly. But the marking probability of nodes with 
high credibility is low, which can improve the network lifetime. Through the above analysis, it is easy to choose 
appropriate marking probability function. The function is available if it meets the character 1, so it is convenient to 
design the marking probability function. For example: sina function is a function that the change quantity of the 
value in this function is less with the change of independent variable in the first, and then the change quantity is more, 
which can meet the requirement of character 1. Therefore, this paper constructs the marking probability function as 
Eq. (8) to illustrate the effectiveness of TAPM scheme. It is important to note that Eq. (8) is one of marking 
probability function meets the character 1. There are many functions which can meet the character 1. But this doesn’t 
influence the conclusions of this paper. 






sin(𝔟𝔟)�� ,   𝑐𝑐 ∈ [𝔞𝔞,𝔟𝔟]                (8) 
    Where 𝑐𝑐 is the trust of node, which is denoted in Eq. (7) for node 𝑗𝑗. 𝔞𝔞 and 𝔟𝔟 are two constant, respectively 
denote the upper and lower bounds value of node trust. Fig. 3 shows a specific example of Eq. (8). 
4.4 The number of detect packets 
The other important innovation of TAPM scheme is to generate detection packets. Thus this section discusses 
how to determine the number of detection packets, and decides which nodes need to generate detection packets. The 
number of detection packets need to be generated depends on the following two factors: (1) It is better to protect 
cyber security for generating more detect packets. ①  The number of detection packets are related to node’s 
credibility. Obviously, the lower node trust is, the more number of detection packets need to be generated. ② The 
time allowed for locating malicious nodes. If the system need to locate malicious nodes as fast as possible, it needs 
to generate many detection packets as soon as possible. (2) But large number of detect packets can harm network 
lifetime, it should reduce the number of detection packets in order not to reduce the network lifetime. Therefore, the 
number of detection packets need to take into account these two factors, so as to obtain an optimal equilibrium point, 
which can safeguard cyber security and ensure higher network lifetime. 
Like many systems [32], the number of detection packets in TAPM scheme exist equilibrium point between the 
cost and obtained "payoff". Generally speaking, in the early stages, the number of detection packets is small, 
increasing the number of detection packets a little can greatly shorten the time to locate malicious nodes, so as to 
take corresponding measures to remove malicious nodes. After removing malicious nodes, the system does not need 
generate so much detection packets, and the marking probability of nodes can be reduced. To do so, the system can 
locate malicious nodes quickly with higher security and decrease the amount of marking information at low cost. 
But when the number of detection packets arrive to a certain amount, the increase of detection packets can bring a 
little increase in payoff. Therefore, it is not a wise decision to increase the number of detect packets in this time. In 
this paper, some conclusions can be obtained from many researches: the utility function between obtained payoff by 
 
system and obtained sent detection packets (cost) is one of non-linear functions [32], it meets the practical of TAPM 
scheme. Namely: when the number of detection packets are less, payoff is rising quickly with the growth of detection 
packets, so its utility is high. But after arrive to a certain degree, the number of generating detect packets increase, 
the growth of obtained payoff is very small, so its utility is small. The same as Ref. [1, 32], Eq. (9) is adopted as 
utility function for TAPM. 
                𝒢𝒢(𝒟𝒟) = 𝛽𝛽 log(1 +𝒟𝒟)+γ𝒟𝒟                                      (9) 
Where 𝛽𝛽, γ are constant parameters. The obtained payoff is the difference between utility function and cost. The 
system pays the cost for energy consumption for generating detection packets. The cost can be calculated based on 
energy consumption function Eq. (1) and the number of generating data function Eq. (2). The cost paid is a linear 
relationship with the number of sending detect packets, that is, 𝔈𝔈𝒟𝒟,𝔈𝔈 are constant coefficient. The payoff function 
can be shown: 
            𝔄𝔄 = 𝛽𝛽 log(1 + 𝒟𝒟)+γ𝒟𝒟 − 𝔈𝔈𝒟𝒟                                     (10) 
Theorem 1. In TAPM scheme, the optimal number of detect packets 𝒟𝒟 to maximize its payoff is given by Eq. (11): 
𝒟𝒟∗ = 𝛽𝛽
𝔈𝔈−γ
− 1                                                 (11) 
Proof: Obviously, 𝒟𝒟 is a bounded closed set in Euclidean space, and the payoff function Eq. (10) is continuous on 
its scheme space [32]. The payoff function is concave function, it is proved in the following formula, and there is a 
















< 0, 𝔄𝔄 is strictly concave in 𝒟𝒟. Hence, the optimal 𝒟𝒟 that maximizes 𝔄𝔄 is determined by letting 
the marginal utility 𝜕𝜕𝔄𝔄
𝜕𝜕(𝒟𝒟)
 equal to 0, i. e.  𝔈𝔈 − γ = 𝛽𝛽
1+𝒟𝒟
. 𝒟𝒟 = 𝛽𝛽
𝔈𝔈−γ
− 1, which leads to Eq. (11).  
■ 
The system can determine the number of nodes after Theorem 1 determine the number of optimized detect packets, 
the number of generating detect packets by one nodes are 𝔗𝔗 in a detection cycle, and the number of requirement 
detection packets are 𝒟𝒟 in a detect cycle. So the number of selected nodes which is used to send detect packets are: 
                     𝕧𝕧 = 𝒟𝒟 𝔗𝔗⁄                                                (12) 
After obtain 𝕧𝕧 detection packets which need to be generate, it is easy to choose nodes to generate detect packets. 
The method is that select 𝕧𝕧 nodes which nearest to malicious nodes and their packets route to Sink through 
malicious nodes. For example, in Fig. 1, considering the node 𝑣𝑣10 is suspicious node which needs to generate 
detection packets. it can calculate 𝕧𝕧=3 according Eq. (12). It should select 3 nodes  𝑣𝑣9,  𝑣𝑣8,  𝑣𝑣16 nearest to node 
 𝑣𝑣10 to generate detect packets. If 𝕧𝕧=2, nodes 𝑣𝑣9,  𝑣𝑣16 should be selected, because the distance between node 𝑣𝑣9 
or 𝑣𝑣16 and node  𝑣𝑣10 is shortest. 
4.5 TAPM traceback algorithm 
Through the above analysis, the algorithm about TAPM scheme is given. Algorithm has 2 executive body, (1) 
the first is the Sink. The task for the Sink are: (a) Trust evaluation, in order to obtain trust degree of each node; (b) 
calculate the marking probability of nodes using Eq. (8); (c) Calculate the number of sent probe packets of suspicious 
nodes whose credibility below a certain threshold according to Eq. (11); (d) Calculate the number of nodes for 
sending detect packets using Eq. (12); (e) Select 𝕧𝕧 nodes to send probe packets, on the basis of the principle of 
 
closest to the suspicious nodes. (f) Report the system’s decision to related nodes, which include the marking 
probability of each node, the number of nodes for sending detect packets, and the number of sent probe packets. (2) 
The second executive body is sensor node, it marks each passed packet with a certain probability according to the 
given probability. If it is a detection node, it sends detect packets according to the given time and send rate. Obviously, 
the marking probability for probe packet is 1. The algorithm for executive body the Sink and sensor node are shown 
respectively in algorithm 1 and 2 algorithm. 
Algorithm 1. The pseudo-code of TAPM traceback algorithm for Sink 
Algorithm 1: The trust-aware probability marking traceback algorithm for Sink 
1: For each time t Do 
2:    For each node 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 
3:          evaluation 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 of node 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 as Ref. [31]; 
4:          computing the trust of  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  node 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 using Eq. (6);   
5:          computing the marking probability 𝔭𝔭𝑖𝑖 =  ℒ( 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖) of node  𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 using Eq. (8);   
6:          If 𝔭𝔭𝑖𝑖 ≤ ∆ then                               //∆ is the trust threshold 
7:              computing the optimization number of detect packets 𝒟𝒟𝑖𝑖∗ using Eq. (11);  
8:              computing the 𝕧𝕧 using Eq. (12); 
9:              select the candidate node set to send detect packets based on the nearest principles, which is  
                  𝔻𝔻𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗�  |𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 ∈ the top 𝒟𝒟𝑖𝑖∗nearest node of  node 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 
10:              the detect packets  𝓏𝓏𝑗𝑗  of each detect node for node 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is 𝕧𝕧 𝔻𝔻𝑖𝑖⁄ ; 
11:          End if; 
12:          notice each node with 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖′𝑠𝑠 information include {𝔭𝔭𝑖𝑖}; 
13:         notice  𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝔻𝔻𝑖𝑖 with  𝓏𝓏𝑗𝑗; 
14:    End for 
15: End For 
Algorithm 2. The pseudo-code of TAPM traceback algorithm for Sensor node 
 
Algorithm 2: The trust-aware probability marking traceback algorithm for sensor node 
Input：node 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 receive the number of detect packets  𝓏𝓏𝑖𝑖 , each nodes’ marking probability 𝔭𝔭𝑘𝑘; 
Output: Forward the packet to next hop node  
1: For each receive packets 𝕡𝕡 Do 
2:    If 𝕡𝕡 ∈data packets then              // 𝕡𝕡 is not detect packets 
3:         𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 =Get_source_node(𝕡𝕡);       // 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 is the source node of packets 𝕡𝕡  
4:         marking packets with 𝔭𝔭𝑓𝑓; 
5:         If marking this packet 𝕡𝕡 then    //with a certain probability for marking packets 𝕡𝕡 
6:             𝕡𝕡=Ekey(|f_log|f_mig|N_ID|Hkey (𝕡𝕡.data)| 𝕡𝕡); //Ekey stand data encryption,  
7:         End if                                   // Hkey denote hash 
8:    Else                                // 𝕡𝕡 is detect packets 
9:         𝕡𝕡=Ekey(|f_log|f_mig|N_ID|Hkey (𝕡𝕡.data)| 𝕡𝕡);  //detect packet marking probability is 1 
10:    End if 
11:    forwarding packet 𝕡𝕡 to next node;         //Let processed packet 𝕡𝕡 forwarding to next node 
12: End for 
13: For z = 1 to 𝓏𝓏𝑖𝑖 Do 
14:         Produce packet 𝕡𝕡 which a data field is null;  
15:         𝕡𝕡=Ekey(|f_log|f_mig|N_ID|Hkey (𝕡𝕡.data)| 𝕡𝕡);  //marking this packet; 
 
16:         forwarding packet 𝕡𝕡 to next node; 
17: End For 
The computation complexity of the TAPM traceback algorithm could be discussed as follow: algorithm 1 and 
algorithm 2 are easy. Algorithm 1 is performed by the sink. The sink calculates node trust, then gives different 
marking probability according to node trust. So its computation complexity is 𝛰𝛰(𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚), where 𝑘𝑘 is a constant, 𝑚𝑚 is 
the number of nodes in the network. For algorithm 2, each node calculates hash function and encryption function. Its 
computation complexity is 𝛰𝛰(ℌ(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑) + 𝔈𝔈(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑)), where ℌ(𝑚𝑚) is the requirement time function 
for hash data packet with 𝑚𝑚 bits, and 𝔈𝔈(𝑚𝑚) is the requirement time for encrypt data packet with 𝑚𝑚 bits. Because 
the length of data packets in the network are short, its computation complexity is relatively small. 
5 Performance Analysis of TAPM scheme 
5.1 The number of data and the network life for node 
This paper adopts logarithmic normal distribution to describe distribution of node trust [30], because 
logarithmic normal distribution can represent that there are many nodes with high credibility and less malicious 





2(𝜎𝜎′)2 ,   𝑥𝑥 > 0                                (13) 
Where parameters 𝜇𝜇′ and 𝜎𝜎′ determine the function of logarithmic normal distribution (see from Fig. 1). The 
average value 𝜇𝜇 and variance 𝜎𝜎2 in logarithmic normal distribution are respectively:  
  𝜇𝜇 = 𝑙𝑙𝜇𝜇′+(𝑥𝑥′)2 2⁄ ,  𝜎𝜎2 = 𝑙𝑙2𝜇𝜇′+(𝑥𝑥′)2�𝑙𝑙(𝑥𝑥′)2 − 1�                             (14) 
The probability rule for the random variable in the logarithmic normal distribution is: the value closer to 𝜇𝜇, 
the higher the probability is. The smaller the 𝜎𝜎 is, the more the distribution concentrate on the area near to 𝜇𝜇, the 
bigger the 𝜎𝜎 is, the more the distribution dispersed. Therefore, we can get the value of 𝜇𝜇′and 𝜎𝜎′ if node’s 𝜇𝜇 and 
𝜎𝜎 have to be known. 
      𝜇𝜇′ = ln𝜇𝜇 − (𝑥𝑥′)
2
2




+ 1�                                 (15) 
   Analyse the number of data and marking information under the condition of knowing the distribution function 
of node trust. Considering the network radius is 𝑅𝑅, the transmitting radius is 𝑟𝑟, the event generation rate of the 
network is 𝜆𝜆, each node sends data packets to the Sink through the shortest routing method. Ref. [29] has proved 
that the number of sending data packets of the nodes at 𝑙𝑙 = ℎ𝑟𝑟 + 𝑥𝑥 distance from the Sink are: 
𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 = �(𝑧𝑧 + 1) +
𝑧𝑧(𝑧𝑧+1)𝑟𝑟
2𝑒𝑒
� 𝜆𝜆 | 𝑧𝑧 = �
𝑅𝑅−𝑒𝑒
𝑟𝑟
�                                    (16) 
Theorem 2. In TAPM scheme, the number of marking tuples for marking passed data packets by nodes at 𝑙𝑙 = ℎ𝑟𝑟 +
𝓎𝓎 distance from Sink are: 
𝔪𝔪𝑒𝑒 = �(𝑧𝑧 + 1) +
𝑧𝑧(𝑧𝑧+1)𝑟𝑟
2𝑒𝑒
� 𝜆𝜆 ∫ ℒ(𝑥𝑥)𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)                                (17) 
Proof: According to Eq. (16), the number of forwarded data packets by nodes at 𝑙𝑙 away from Sink are 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒. Because 
 
data packets are come from the network nodes, the marking probability of the packets are determined based on the 
nodes trust. Therefore the marking probability also obey the distribution of node trust. Considering the distribution 
density function of node trust is 𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥), and the transformation function from node trust to marking probability is 
ℒ(𝑥𝑥). The expected marking probability for data packets can be obtained: 
             𝔼𝔼𝔣𝔣 = ∫ ℒ(𝑥𝑥)
𝑏𝑏
𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)                                                 (18) 
Where 𝔼𝔼𝔣𝔣 said the expected marking probability in node trust distribution function 𝔣𝔣, the number of assumed 
data packets are 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒, so the number of marking tuple for marking data packets are: 
𝔪𝔪𝑒𝑒 = 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝔼𝔼𝔣𝔣 = �(𝑧𝑧 + 1) +
𝑧𝑧(𝑧𝑧+1)𝑟𝑟
2𝑒𝑒
� 𝜆𝜆 ∫ ℒ(𝑥𝑥)𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)                         (19) 
■ 
In theorem 2, the number of marking tuples for the nodes at 𝑙𝑙 away from Sink are 𝔪𝔪𝑒𝑒 in the condition of node 
trust distribution function 𝔣𝔣. When the distribution function 𝔣𝔣 of node trust is logarithmic normal distribution, the 
transformation function from node trust to marking probability is used by Eq. (8). The number of marked marking 
tuple by nodes at 𝑙𝑙 away from Sink are 𝔪𝔪𝑒𝑒: 













2(𝜎𝜎′)2 �𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 �(𝑧𝑧 + 1) +
𝑧𝑧(𝑧𝑧+1)𝑟𝑟
2𝑒𝑒
� 𝜆𝜆   (20) 
Theorem 3. In TAPM scheme, the number of total marking tuple by nodes at 𝑙𝑙 = ℎ𝑟𝑟 + 𝓎𝓎 away from Sink are: 








�𝜆𝜆𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖=0  | 𝑧𝑧 = �
𝑅𝑅−𝑒𝑒
𝑟𝑟
�         (21) 
Proof: nodes at 𝑙𝑙 away from Sink forward the marked marking tuples in 𝑙𝑙 + 𝑟𝑟, 𝑙𝑙 + 2𝑟𝑟, … , 𝑙𝑙 + 𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟 area. Because 
𝑧𝑧 = �𝑅𝑅−𝑒𝑒
𝑟𝑟
�, 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒+𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 can be written: 








�𝜆𝜆                           (22) 
   The number of marking tuples are: 








�𝜆𝜆𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖=0  | 𝑧𝑧 = �
𝑅𝑅−𝑒𝑒
𝑟𝑟
�     (23) 
   ■ 
Inference 1: In PM scheme, consider the marking probability is 𝒫𝒫𝑎𝑎, the ratio of the number of marking tuples of 
TAPM scheme over PM scheme is: 
                𝜑𝜑 = 𝒫𝒫𝑎𝑎 𝔼𝔼𝔣𝔣⁄  | 𝔼𝔼𝔣𝔣 = ∫ ℒ(𝑥𝑥)
𝑏𝑏
𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)                                   (24) 
Proof: According to theorem 2, for TAPM scheme, the number of marked marking tuple for passed data packets by 
nodes at 𝑙𝑙 = ℎ𝑟𝑟 + 𝑥𝑥 away from Sink are: 𝔪𝔪𝑒𝑒 = 𝔼𝔼𝔣𝔣 �(𝑧𝑧 + 1) +
𝑧𝑧(𝑧𝑧+1)𝑟𝑟
2𝑒𝑒
� 𝜆𝜆. In PM scheme, the marking probability 
for each node is 𝒫𝒫𝑎𝑎, the number of marked marking tuple are: 
            ℭℓ
𝑎𝑎 = 𝒫𝒫𝑎𝑎 �(𝑧𝑧 + 1) +
𝑧𝑧(𝑧𝑧+1)𝑟𝑟
2𝑒𝑒
� 𝜆𝜆                                        (25) 
          So: 𝜑𝜑 = ℭℓ
𝑎𝑎 𝔪𝔪𝑒𝑒⁄ = 𝒫𝒫𝑎𝑎 𝔼𝔼𝔣𝔣⁄ . 
 
■ 
For TAPM scheme, nodes also forward the data of probe packets, it can be seen in theorem 4.  
Theorem 4. In TAPM scheme, the number of marking tuples for forwarding the detection packets by nodes at 𝑙𝑙 =












�𝜆𝜆𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖=0  | 𝑧𝑧 = �
𝑅𝑅−𝑒𝑒
𝑟𝑟
�       (26) 
Proof: Based on TAPM algorithm, the proportion of suspicious nodes for probe packets is: ∫ 𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)Δ𝑎𝑎 , those suspicious 
nodes do a detection in 𝜅𝜅 data collection cycle (refer to the time for each node send a data packet in the network). 
According to theorem 1, the number of generated detect packets for each node are 𝒟𝒟∗. The number of marked 




𝒟𝒟∗ �(𝑧𝑧 + 1) + 𝑧𝑧(𝑧𝑧+1)𝑟𝑟
2𝑒𝑒
� ∫ 𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)Δ𝑎𝑎                                       (27) 
   Similar to theorem 3, nodes at 𝑙𝑙 away from Sink forward the marked marking tuples for probe packets of 

















�𝜆𝜆𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖=0  | 𝑧𝑧 = �
𝑅𝑅−𝑒𝑒
𝑟𝑟
�  (28) 
■ 
Considering the length of data packets and marking tuple is 𝔥𝔥 bits and 𝔵𝔵 bits respectively, then in TAPM 
scheme, according to Eq. (16), Eq. (21), and Eq. (26), the number of data packets 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 and marking tuple 𝕄𝕄𝑒𝑒 of 
nodes at 𝑙𝑙 away from Sink can be obtained. So the total amount of information are: 
             𝔇𝔇𝑒𝑒t=𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝔥𝔥 + 𝕄𝕄𝑒𝑒𝔵𝔵+𝔹𝔹𝑒𝑒𝔵𝔵                                                       (29) 
  For PM scheme, the total amount of assumed information by nodes at 𝑙𝑙 away from the Sink are: 
 𝔇𝔇𝑒𝑒








�𝜆𝜆𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖=0           (30) 
  According to Eq. (1), considering energy consumption for sending 1 bit is ℯ(𝓇𝓇), where  𝓇𝓇 transmission distance 
is. So, the lifetime in TAPM can be get as follow: 






   Where 𝑙𝑙0 is the node closest to the Sink node.             (31) 






          Where 𝑙𝑙0 is the node closest to the Sink node.            (32) 
5.2 Traceback time analysis 
Because it is little meaningless to traceback for "good" nodes. Therefore, traceback time is the requirement time 
to build a complete path from Sink to malicious nodes. Obviously, the collected marking information of the Sink 
increase with the large number of collected data packets, and the path from Sink to malicious nodes can be 
reconstructed. It can be seen that the faster the speed of collecting data packets is in PM scheme without active 
detection, the shorter the traceback time is. In order to compare to different traceback schemes, therefore, in this 
paper, we define the requirement time for collecting a date packet of each node as a unit of time, or called a round, 
the requirement rounds for reconstruct the path from Sink to malicious nodes in traceback time are: 
(1) Firstly, analyze the making probability of malicious nodes in TAPM scheme. In TAPM scheme, it adopts 
 
higher marking probability for nodes with low credibility, so the marking probability of most malicious nodes will 
be very high, but the system cannot always identify malicious nodes accurately, the reason is that: a small number 
of malicious nodes with low marking probability. In this way, the distribution density function of making probability 
can also be described by the function of logarithmic normal distribution in Eq. (33), 𝑦𝑦 in Eq. (34) saids the making 
probability. The distribution function of making probability of malicious nodes is shown in Fig. 9, 𝜇𝜇 and 𝜎𝜎 in the 
distribution function are respectively denote the average making probability and variance of malicious node. So the 






2(𝜎𝜎′)2 ,   𝑥𝑥 > 0                                    (33) 
(2) Secondly, analyze trackback time. Set the hops that one nodes away from Sink are 𝒽𝒽 , the marking 
probability of each node is 𝓅𝓅, when the node sends 𝑚𝑚 data packets, the probability for the attack paths can be 
reconstructed is: 
               ℙ𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎=(1 −𝓅𝓅̅𝑖𝑖)𝒽𝒽                                                 (34) 
According Eq. (34), Fig. 10 gives the probability for reconstructing one attack path when a node generates 𝑚𝑚 
data packets and 𝒽𝒽=5. When the marking probability is low, 𝓅𝓅=0.1, and a node generates 15 data packets, the 
probability for reconstructing attack path is only 31.58%, and when marking probability 𝓅𝓅=0.8, a node only sends 
4 data packets, the probability is greater than 99%. When a node generates 9 data packets, the probability is almost 
100%. So it is important to improve marking probability of malicious nodes to reduce traceback time. On the contrary, 
if the probability for reconstructing attack path is ℙ𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎, the number of packets need to be generated: 




                                                  (35) 
   (3) The effect of detection in TAPM scheme on traceback time. Eq. (34) and Eq. (35) show that the traceback 
time is a kind of probability function if the marking probability isn’t 1. In TAPM scheme, the marking probability 
for generate detect packets is almost 1, thus it can ensure that traceback time in TAPM scheme has a certain upper 
bound, and it is an important improvement. 
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Fig. 9 distribution function of making probability of 
malicious nodes 
Fig. 10 The relation between the requirement packets and the 
probability the attack path to be reconstructed (𝒽𝒽=5) 
 
6 Experimental results 
    Network parameters are set as follows: the network radius 𝑅𝑅=500m, 𝑟𝑟=60m, there are 800 nodes in network, 
10% of nodes are malicious nodes, and the system proper adjust the value of the parameters according to the 
circumstances of the experiments, under normal circumstances, the proportion for malicious nodes are about 5-15%. 
The packet length are 100 bits, and the length of marking tuple are 10 bits. The requirement time for sending a packet 
to Sink is called a round. The initial marking probability of nodes is 0.5. The trust of nodes in the network is 0.5.  
6. 1 Trackback time 
Traceback time is an important performance indicator for cyber security in traceback scheme. So this section 
analyzes traceback time in TAPM scheme and other schemes. From the analysis of previous researches, Traceback 
time refers to the requirement time for reconstructing a complete path from Sink to malicious nodes. It is meaningless 
to traceback for "good" nodes, so this paper just discusses traceback time of malicious nodes. The average credibility 
for malicious nodes and the average marking probability are given in Fig. 11. The experimental results are consistent 
with our previous analysis: in the experiment, the proportion for malicious nodes is 10%, the result of trust evaluation 
function obey the distribution of logarithmic normal distribution: most nodes have high credibility, and a few of 
nodes trust is low, such as in Fig. 1. The marking probability of nodes with different credibility can be obtained 
according to Eq. (8) (see from Fig. 3). The marking probability of most trusted nodes are very low, a few of malicious 
nodes’ marking probability is very high (see from Fig. 9). The average marking probability in TAPM scheme is about 
19%-27%. For PM scheme, the selected marking probability is the marking probability of the whole network, and in 
general, most of the selected marking probability is above 40%, but the biggest problem is that it is not targeted. 
Thus, though the marking probability is about 40%, the marking probability of malicious nodes is only 40%, but the 
marking probability for malicious nodes in TAPM scheme is about 0.8-1 (see from Fig. 9), it is much higher than 
that of PM scheme. 
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Fig. 11 the average marking probability in TAPM 
Fig. 12 The success probability of reconstructing attack paths in 
a round 
Fig. 12 shows the success probability of reconstructing attack paths in a round in different distance from the 
Sink. Experimental parameters in Fig. 12 are: each node sends a data packet to the Sink in the network, TAPM 
scheme calculates the marking probability used Eq. (8) based on node trust. For PM scheme, the marking probability 
 
is given in Fig. 12. After a round, the probability for reconstructing a complete path from Sink to different nodes is 
success rate of traceback. In TPAM scheme, the marking probability for malicious nodes is 1, so as long as malicious 
nodes send a packet to the Sink, the marking information of all nodes in this routing path can be obtained by the Sink, 
the Sink can reconstruct a complete path when receive a data packet, it may up to 100% traceback. For PM scheme, 
nodes have the same marking probability in the network, the number of forwarding packets in the area near to the 
Sink are far more than the number of forwarding packets in the area far from the Sink, so leading to decrease the 
probability of traceback for nodes far from the Sink (see from Fig. 12). 
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Fig. 13 The average success probability of attack paths can 
be reconstructed in entire network in a round 
Fig. 14 The traceback time (the data collection rounds need to 
reconstruct the attack path ) with success probability is 0.9  
   The average probability of success traceback for malicious nodes is given in Fig. 13. In TAPM scheme, it does 
not guarantee that the marking probability for malicious nodes is high. A small part of malicious nodes have low 
marking probability, so the average success probability for traceback in the network is about 90%. For PM scheme, 
because the success probability for traceback in the area far from the Sink is low, and the area of the area is very 
large, thus the success rate of traceback in the entire network is low. The success rate of traceback is only 33% when 
the marking probability is 50%, and the success rate of traceback is only 74% when the marking probability is 80%, 
Fig. 14 shows the requirement traceback time when the traceback success probability is 0.9. The requirement packets 
refer to the number of marked data packets by node when the traceback success probability is 0.9. The requirement 
traceback time refer to the requirement rounds when the probability for traceback successful of node is 0.9. It can be 
seen that traceback time in PM scheme is far more than that of TAPM scheme. 
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Fig. 15 The traceback time under deference marking 
probability  
Fig. 16 The traceback time (the data collection rounds need to 
reconstruct the attack path ) with success probability is 0.9  
Fig. 15, Fig. 16, Fig. 17 give the average traceback time under different marking probability, network radius 𝑅𝑅 
and the requirement of success traceback probability of the whole network. It can be seen that the traceback time in 
TAPM scheme is 1/2-1/10 than that of PM scheme. This shows that TAPM have better traceback ability to protect 
the network security. 
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Fig. 17 The average traceback time of attack paths can be 
reconstructed  
Fig. 18 The number of marking tuple for reconstructing the 
attack path with success probability is 0.95  
  





















The requirement  probability of attack paths can be reconstructed
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Fig. 19 The traceback time of attack paths can be 
reconstructed with high requirement probability of attack 
paths can be reconstructed  
Fig. 20 The number of marking tuple for reconstructing the 
attack path with high probability   
To achieve the specified traceback success probability, The number of produced marking tuples in PM scheme is 
6.4-7.5 times than that of TAPM scheme when the marking probability is 0.5 (see from Fig. 18), TAPM scheme has 
the characteristics of low cost for the system. Especially the required traceback time for PM scheme is rising very 
fast in the condition of high success probability of traceback (see from Fig. 19), and the system overhead is increasing 
rapidly (see from Fig. 20), and the cost in TAPM scheme did not change, it shows that TAPM scheme is suitable for 
security sensitive applications. 
 
6. 2 Analysis of the amount of mark and network lifetime 
The number of forwarded data packets and marking tuples in different area under different traceback schemes are 
given in Fig. 21 and Fig. 22. The results from the experimental show that: (1) the amount of loaded data and marking 
tuples by nodes in the area near to the Sink is much higher than the amount of loaded data in the area far from the 
Sink. The change of the number of loaded marking tuples is more intense than the change of the number of data 
packets, the reason is that: the length of the loaded marking tuples will continue to grow with routing to the Sink, 
and the length of data packets don’t change. (2) In TAPM scheme, the number of loaded marking tuples are far less 
than the number of loaded marking tuples in PM scheme. This is because a small number of malicious nodes have 
high marking probability, and most of "good" nodes have low marking probability in TAPM scheme, the average 
marking probability is still low. (3) The number of loaded data are equal in different schemes, so the difference 
network lifetime in different scheme are caused by the different of the number of produced marking tuples. So in 
order to improve the network lifetime, it is important to reduce the number of generated marking tuples by traceback 
scheme. Because the number of marking tuples in TAPM scheme are far less than that of PM scheme, the network 
lifetime is longer in TAPM scheme. 
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Fig. 21 The marking tuples and under different schemes    Fig. 22 The marking tuples under different 𝑟𝑟   
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Fig. 23 The total marking tuples under different 𝑅𝑅      Fig. 24 The total marking tuples under different 𝑟𝑟   
The total marking tuples under different 𝑅𝑅 and 𝑟𝑟 are given in Fig. 23 and Fig. 24 respectively. It can be seen 
that: (1) the number of total marking tuples in TAPM scheme are far less than that of PM scheme, its performance is 
 
poorer when PM scheme adopts high marking probability, and the performance for TAPM scheme is stable. When 
𝑟𝑟=60m, under different network radius 𝑅𝑅, the number of total marking tuples are respectively reduced by 34.25%, 
67.16% 73.70% than those of PM scheme respectively with marking probability 0.4, 0.8, 1 (see from Fig. 23). The 
similar conclusions can also be get under different 𝑟𝑟 in 2 schemes. (2) The bigger the network radius 𝑅𝑅 is, the 
more the number of produced marking tuples are. The bigger the transmitting radius 𝑟𝑟 is, the smaller the number of 
produced marking tuples are, the reason is: the bigger the 𝑟𝑟 is, the smaller amount of data loaded by each node, 
which resulting in decreasing the number of loaded marking tuples by each node, at the same time, the number of 
total marking tuples are decreased. The most extreme is when 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑅𝑅, the number of marking tuples is ≤1. 
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Fig. 25 The marking tuples per node under different 𝑅𝑅    Fig. 26 The marking tuples per node under different 𝑟𝑟   
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Fig. 27 The max marking tuples per node under different 𝑅𝑅    Fig. 28 The max marking tuples per node under different 𝑟𝑟   
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Fig. 29 The sum marking tuples and data under different 𝑅𝑅 
with the length of marking tuple is 0.2 times than the length 
of data packet     
Fig. 30 The sum marking tuples and data under different 𝑟𝑟 with 
the length of marking tuple is 0.2 of the length of data packet   
The number of assumed average marking tuples by each node under different 𝑅𝑅 and 𝑟𝑟 are given in Fig. 25 and 
Fig. 26, respectively. Due to the total number of marking tuples are determined in Fig. 25 and Fig. 26, the number of 
loaded average marking tuples is refer to its total number of marking tuples divided by the number of nodes in the 
network, so the results in Fig. 25 and Fig. 26 is similar to the results in Fig. 23 and Fig. 24. Because the network 
lifetime is the time of the death of the first node in the network, and the number of loaded data packets are equal in 
different traceback schemes, so the different network lifetime under different schemes are caused by the largest 
number of marking tuples. Fig. 27 and Fig. 28 give the maximum number of loaded marking tuples by nodes, which 
can be seen from the experimental, the maximum number of marking tuples in TAPM scheme are far less than that 
of PM scheme. 
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Fig. 31 The lifetime under different  𝑅𝑅 with the length of 
marking tuple is 0.6 of the length of data packet   
Fig. 32 The improvement percent on lifetime of TAPM over 
other scheme under different  𝑅𝑅   
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Fig. 33 The lifetime under different 𝑅𝑅 with the length of 
marking tuple is 0.3 of the length of data packet 
Fig. 34 The improvement percent on lifetime of TAPM over 
other scheme under different  𝑅𝑅   
Fig. 29 and Fig. 30 given the total amount of marking information with the length of marking tuple is 0.2 times 
than the length of data packet in different 𝑅𝑅 and 𝑟𝑟. The total information = the number of data packets + 0.2* the 
number of marking tuples. It can be seen from the experimental results that the number of data packet are equal in 
different schemes. The difference of the number of marking tuple in different scheme is very large, but due to the 
length of marking tuple is 0.2 times than the length of data packet, the difference in different schemes is became 
small from the results of Fig. 29 and Fig. 30. It can be seen from Fig. 31 and Fig. 32 that: the improvement percent 
on lifetime of TAPM over PM scheme is 10%, 30%, 37% with the length of marking tuple is 0.6 of the length of data 
packet. However, when the length of marking tuple is 0.3 of the length of data packet, the improvement percent on 
lifetime of TAPM over PM scheme is 6%, 19%, 25% (see from Fig. 33 and Fig. 34). The network lifetime can be 
seen from Fig. 35 with difference ratio of the length of marking tuple over the length of data packet (denote as ∅). 
We can see from Fig. 35 that: the more the ∅ is, the smaller the network lifetime is. This is because, the greater the 
∅ is, the more the amount of information forwarded by nodes, which lead to the lower network lifetime. However, 
the larger the ∅ is, the bigger the proportion for marking tuple account for the forwarded information is. Due to the 
less number of marking tuple in TAPM scheme, so the advantages of the network lifetime are more obvious than 
other schemes. From Fig. 36, you can see that as the ∅ increases from 0.2 to 1, the network lifetime is improved by 
3.66%-12.84 in TAPM scheme than that of PM scheme with 0.4 marking probability, and the network lifetime is 
improved by 12.99%-36.61% in TAPM scheme than that of PM scheme with 0.8 marking probability, the network 
lifetime is improved by 17.05%-44.26% in TAPM scheme than that of PM scheme with 1 marking probability. 
Compare to PM scheme, TAPM scheme has greatly improve on security (traceback time) and the network lifetime. 
In general, to improve the safety of traceback scheme, it often needs to consume more energy. But the two key 
performance indicators are simultaneously improved in TAPM scheme in this paper, this is a kind of innovation. 










30  average marking probability
                       is 0.263 of TAPM
 marking probability is 0.4
 marking probability is 0.8
















































 marking probability is 0.4
 marking probability is 0.8
 marking probability is 1
 
 
Fig. 35 The lifetime  
Fig. 36 The improvement percent on lifetime of TAPM over 
other scheme   
6. 3The performance affected by parameters 
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Fig. 37 The amount of marks affected by the proportion of 
malicious nodes  
Fig. 38 The lifetime affected by the proportion of malicious 
nodes 
An important premise in TAPM scheme is: the proportion of malicious nodes is small in the network, such as 
less than 15%, it meets the practical situation. The number of marking tuples and network lifetime are given under 
different proportion of malicious nodes in Fig. 37and Fig. 38. It can be seen that with the increase of the proportion 
of malicious nodes, the number of marking tuples are straight up, while the network lifetime is decreased in TAPM 
scheme. It explain that TAPM scheme can only be used to the less proportion of malicious nodes in the networks. 
And PM scheme have nothing to do with malicious nodes. 
The effect of the variance of malicious nodes’ credibility on network performance are given in Fig. 39 and Fig. 
40. When the average credibility of nodes is 0.05 (low), because the marking probability for nodes with low 
credibility is high, if the variance of malicious nodes’ credibility increase, the range in 0.05 of the distribution of 
malicious nodes’ credibility are increased. However, the marking probability is decreased when nodes’ credibility is 
large, the space for reducing marking probability is only 0.05, that is to say the growth space is limited. Fig. 3 shows 
that the network lifetime increases with the decrease of the average marking probability (see from Fig. 40). The 0.1 
variance and 0.15 variance of malicious nodes’ credibility is just the opposite. The experiment shows that the ratio 
of malicious nodes and density distribution have effect on the performance of TAPM scheme. 
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Fig. 39 The average marking probability affected by the trust 
variance 
Fig. 40 The lifetime affected by the trust variance  
7 conclusion 
In this paper, a trust-aware probability marking (TAPM) traceback scheme is proposed to fast locate malicious 
source and guarantee cyber security. TAPM scheme sets different marking probability based on node trust which is 
difference from the same marking probability of nodes in the previous schemes. In the network, it is sensible to 
rebuilt attach path of malicious nodes, so it adopts high marking probability for nodes with low credibility to reduce 
the traceback time, which is advantageous to network security. A small part of network nodes are malicious nodes, 
though the malicious nodes have high marking probability, the average marking probability of the entire network is 
still low, TAPM scheme can reduce the amount of marking information, so as to improve the network lifetime. TAPM 
scheme not only improve the network lifetime, but also can reduce the traceback time. Moreover, TAPM scheme 
adopts active detection methods to ensure that the attach path can be reconstructed. The results of experiments have 
proved that TAPM scheme has good performances. TAPM respectively reduce the number of the total marking tuples 
by 34.25%, 67.16%, 73.70% than PM scheme respectively with the 0.4, 0.8, 1 marking probability, the network 
lifetime respectively is improved by 3.66%-12.84,12.99%-36.61%,17.05%-44.26% than PM scheme, the trace time 
is 1/2-1/10 times than that of PM scheme. Though TAPM scheme has better performance, the energy utilization is 
lower. The areas far away from sink have much more energy left, but the energy consumption in the areas near to the 
Sink is highest. In the future work, a scheme, makes full use of the left energy and has better performance, should be 
studied. 
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